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Declaratory judgments in certain special cases have been rendered in
Anglo-American courts from time immemorial. For example, interpleader
suits, suits by fiduciaries to obtain judicial instructions, and suits to quiet
title; it may be said that the recent statutes providing for declaratory judg-
ments do not inaugurate any novelty but they merely have the effect of ex-
tending such declaratory jurisdiction to include a wider range of legal and
equitable relations.
The distinguishing characteristic of the declaratory judgment is that it
may conclusively declare the existing rights of litigants without necessarily
being followed or accompanied by execution or by other coercive process or
order to give effect to the declaration.
The proceeding is an implement of preventive justice rather than of
curative justice, having for its purpose the settlement of disputes before
there has been an overt act or physical invasion of a party's rights.
Stated another way, the purpose is to obtain a judicial declaration as to
disputed rights before there has been any change in the status quo; before
a party has acted on his own interpretation of his rights; or before a wrong
has been committed which might destroy or impair rights. An adjudicaticn
may be obtained first without having to act at one's peril, without first incur-
ring a penalty or liability for damages.
Under this procedure, a party can more effectively assert his legal po-
sition, without having to assume that cocksureness that is humiliated by an ad-
verse adjudication. As was aptly said during a debate in Congress when the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Bill was under consideration:
Under the present law you take a step in the dark and then turn on the
light to see if you have stepped into a hole. Under the declaratory judg-
ment law, you turn on the light and then take the step.
In addition to the settlement of private disputes, the declaratory judg-
ment proceeding has equal value in the field of administrative law, in which
an adjudication may be obtained without the prior necessity of a possible
violation, and risk of fine or imprisonment.
The declaratory judgment proceeding is highly beneficial in obtaining
* This article is adapted from a lecture given tinder the auspices of the Dade County
Bar Association at Miami, Florida on March 5, 1949.
** Member of the Florida Bar.
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an adjudication of rights which formerly were obtainable only by resorting
to the extraordinary legal remedies and injunctions. It has been said by Pro-
fessor Borchard of Yale that the injunctive process and the proceedings for
extraordinary legal remedies, all of ancient origin, have accumulated a vast
cargo of technicalities, so that one resorting to such remedies often finds
himself engulfed in a procedural bog.
The first Florida declaratory judgments statute was enacted 30 years
ago.' In 1943, Florida adopted the Uniform Act, with modifications.
The 1919 Act applied only to bills in equity for the construction of a
deed, will, contract or other instrument in writhig, and for a declaration of
the rights of the person interested therein. The supreme court held that this
statute was limited to questions of construction and to the declaration rights
existing under such construction.
2
The 1943 Act broadens the jurisdiction so as to afford relief to any in-
terested person who may be in doubt as to his rights under a deed, will, con-
tract, memorandum or other instrument in writing and whose rights, status
or other legal or equitable relations are affected by such writing or by any
such statute, regulation or municipal ordinance, including the determination
of any question of construction or validity. The court is expressly authorized
to ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next-of-kin, or
others; to direct a fiduciary to abstain from doing any particular act; and
also to determine any question arising in the administration of an estate
or trust.
COMPARISON'OF UNIFORM AND FLORIDA ACTS
The Act of 1943 differs from the Uniform Act in that it expressly
authorizes the court to determine the existence or nonexistence of any
immunity, power, privilege or right, or of any fact upon which they may
depend, whether such immunity, power, privilege or right is presently existing
or will arise in the future. For that reason and also because of other additions
which we have in the Florida Act that are not contained in the Uniform
Act, cases decided tinder the Uniform Act have to be valued in the light
of these conspicuous differences.
It has been held in some cases under the Uniform Act that the court
may refuse a declaratory judgment where the determination turns only upon
a question of fact. (As has been seen, the Florida statute has expressly
authorized the courts to determine a question of fact.) These cases would
not prevent the determination under the Florida Act of an immunity, power,
privilege or right depending upon a question of fact.
1. C. 7857, Acts of 1919.
2. Stuart v. Stephanus, 94 Fla. 1087, 114 So. 767 (1927).
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Unlike the Uniform Act, the Florida statute of 1943 authorizes the
court to grant relief by way of anticipation With respect to any act not yet
done or any event which has not yet happened. The exact meaning and
effect of this provision are yet to be determined by the court. The term
"relief by way of anticipation" is not self-defining. How and to what extent
the court may grant relief by way of anticipation is something yetto be ex-
plored. By that is not meant that the court may not declare rights that depend
on future events, but there one approaches a no-man's land. All contracts look
to the future.
Another difference between the Florida Act and the Uniform Act is
that the Uniform Act vests the court with discretionary power to refuse
a judgment where it would not terminate the controversy or the uncertainty.
This discretionary power of refusal is conspicuously omitted from the
Florida statute; but the omission may he more apparent than substantial,
for the court would hardly he likely to proceed to a useless declaratory
judgment that obviously would not terminate the controversy or remove
the uncertainty.
FUTURE Rirs
In some of the decisions from other states there are dicta to effect
that the court will not declare "future rights." These dicta are somewhat
confusing. Of course the courts would not constitute themselves advisors
on hypothetical issues because that would not be a judicial function. Onthe
other hand, declarations can be and are frequently made in respect of future
events, especially those events that are practically certain to occur and, of
course, future events involving acts which a contracting party is obligated
to do. For example, the court nay declare what rights would vest or exist
upon the death of a certain person, assuming of course that those interests
which would be affected by the event, and by the declaration are adequately
represented in the proceedings.
In a. Florida case,8 the court refused to declare what would be the rights,
under a will, of two charitable corporations who were contingent remain-
dermen, because such remainder interests were dependent upon whether
one of two persons would die without issue. However, if the vesting of a
future right depends not only upon the happening of a certain future event
that is bound to occur, but depends upon the happening of two or more future
events and the sequence in which they happen, there would be considerable
doubt as to the holding. Surely the court would be less disposed to declare
what rights would exist if B dlied after A. and also what the rights would
be on the other hand if A died after B. In short, the death of B after
3. Van Roy v. Hoover, 96 Fla. 194, 117 So. 887 (1928).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the death of A is" not a future event that is practically certain to happen.
It is not certain at all, for no one could say whether B will die after A or
whether A will die after B.
There are numerous instances in which the courts declare rights that
would exist only upon the happening of a future event. The cases are almost
innumerable. For example, (1) the liability of a surety company in the
event that a judgment is entered against the assured, and even in the event
that judgments aggregating a certain sum should be rendered against the
assured; (2) the right to future damages-although not the amount of
future damages-as well as the right to present damages and the amount of
present damages; (3) whether a tenant will be entitled to a renewal of his
lease at the end of his present term, or entitled to exercise some other option.
An instance in which the court will declare future rights where the future
event is not certain, would be the right of subrogation of a surety upon
payment of a certain claim. Of course the surety may never pay the clain.
Other future rights which may be declared are the right to future interest,
rents', royalties or profits; the right to a pension in the event of retirement;
the right of a widow in the event of her husband's death; the right to redeem
a mortgage; the right to cancel a long-term contract; the obligation to nmake
certain payments in the event a person shall be married; the right to deliver
goods or to cancel a contract upon the termination of war; liability for or
immunity from future taxation.
The court may declare whether or not a party has the right or the
obligation to build or make certain improvements upon expiration of a
certain period of time or upon the happening of a certain event.
The construction or effect of a deed or other written instrument may be
clear, unambiguous and altogether free from doubt at the time of its
execution; yet, some subsequent event or some change of circumstances may
necessitate a declaration as to the rights of the parties. A common example,
familiar to most lawyers. is the suit to declare rights of parties in respect
of a restrictive covenant, where changes in the neighborhood have occurred
since the covenant went into effect.
In the Florida statute 4 there is a special provision relating to jury trials
which is not contained in the Uniform Act. There is no need to dwell upon
that provision except to comment on the fact that it leaves in some doubt and
some uncertainty the right of a party to obtain a special verdict of the jury
or to submit issues of fact or special interrogatories. The word "may" is
used, and it is highly possible that might leave it within the discretion of
the judge as to whether the party would have a right to submit to the jury
issues of fact found in answer to special interrogatories.
4. FLA. STAT. § 87.08 (1943).
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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Another important provision contained in the Florida statutes 5 is the
categorical statement that the right of no party shall be affected-that is,
no person shall be affected-who is not a party to the proceeding. There is
a sentence, "No declaration shall prejudice the right of persons not parties
to the proceedings." 6 That raises the question, of course, to what extent a
declaratory judgment proceeding will invbke and apply the equitable doctrine
of virtual representation. Persons who are admittedly not before the court
may he bound under the doctrine of virtual representation because they are
members of a class of persons, and the class is represented before the court
so as to bind the members of the class who are absent.
The Florida statute ' also contains an express provision which is of
considerable importance; that an adequate remedy, or any other remedy
shall not preclude the application of the declaratory judgmenJt statute.
FLORIDA DECISIONS
In one case 8 the court refused to determine the validity of a tax deed
under the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1919, holding that the statute con-
templated first, a construction of a written instrument, and second, a declara-
tion of rights following such construction; that the statute did not authorize
an exploration of matters of fact antecedent to the issuance of the deed to
determine its validity. Another case "' involving the validity of a drainage
tax deed reached the same result. 10 Lippman v. Shapiro," a recent Florida
decision, was a suit to obtain a declaratory judgment regarding the rights
of an assignee of an open account. The case Was governed by the statute of
1919. The suit was dismissed upon the ground that there was no written
instrument requiring construction, the court holding that a simple and
unambiguous assignment of an open accoupt could not under the statute be
made the subject of a chancery suit, thereby depriving the defendants of a
right to trial by jury; the opinion added that, ". . . if this were not true, then
every suit on an alleged promissory note, bond or other written obligation
could be instituted in chancery instead of at law."
FUTURE INTERESTS-WILLS
One of the most interesting aspects of this question involves the deter-
ruination of future interests. The problem is well illustrated by a California
5. FLA. STAT. § 87.10 (1943).
6. Ibid.
7. FLA. STAT. § 87.12 (1943).
8. Stuart v. Stephanus, 94 Fla. 1087, 114 So. 767 (1927).
9. Cook v. Portious, 98 Fla. 373, 123 So. 765 (19-9).
10, See note 2 sipra.
11. 151 Fla. 327. 9 So.2d 631 (1942),
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case,1 2 where the will provided that on the death of the life beneficiary the
trust corpus was to go to "then living" children of the life beneficiary. There
were only two children of the life beneficiary and they entered into an
agreement whereby each renounced a one-half interest in the trust and
agreed that one-half of the trust should become the property of the heirs
of the one who should predecease the life beneficiary. The reason for the
agreement was that without such an agreement if one of these children of
the life beneficiary should die during the lifetime of the life beneficiary,
the heirs and their decendents would have been excluded. That agreement
had been entered into while the life beneficiary was still living. Thereafter
and while the life beneficiary was still living one of the children (parties)
repudiated the agreement and claimed to be no longer bound by it. A suit
for declaratory judgment was brought to determine the validity of the agree-
ment and whether or not the parties were bound. The court took jurisdiction
of the case and entered a declaratory judgment, holding that the agreement
was valid and that the parties were bound. That suit was instituted while the
life beneficiary was still living, thus furnishing an interesting example of a
case in which the court will determine future rights that might possibly come
into existence upon the happening of an event sometime in the future. The
case also suggests other instances in which parties enter into an agreement
which on its face appears to be perfectly unambiguous, perfectly valid, and
binding, particularly in that class of cases where there may be some rela-
tionship of trust and confidence. Such a relationship would include a member
of a family, or parent and child, or husband and wife, or people in some
other relationship which could or might be termed a relationship of trust
and confidence.
In a recent Connecticut case,' the court determined whether the survivor
of three daughters of the testator had a pbwer to appoint the principal of a
trust fund. The only persons with a possible adverse interest would have
been the future children of the plaintiff, whose birth was highly improbable.
The reasoning of the court was that it was necessary in the determination
of estate and inheritance taxes. In a later case. 14 the Connecticut court
denied relief because of failure to bring in as parties persons who might
qualify as heirs upon the death of the life beneficiary.
Where there is any chance of that contention being made, there is always
some doubt about whether there is a valid contract. It seems that where
a person has entered into a contract of an ante-nuptial nature that the rela-
tionship between the contracting parties is such that it could very well at
12. Caldwell v. Rosenberg, 47 Cal.2d 143, 117 P.2d 366 (1941).
13. Wooster v. Union and N. H. Trust Co., 132 Coon, 309, 43 A.2d 734 (1945).
14. Brennan v. Russell, 133 Conn. 442, 52 A.2d 308 (1947).
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some later time be contended that this relationship of trust and confidence
held the contract open.' 5
In an Idaho case " there was a contract for the sale of land. The vendor
in the contract had been in an insane asylum and after being released, he
and the vendee entered into this contract; he paid part of the money, and
the vendee had some serious misgivings about whether the vendor was com-
petent and whether he had a valid contract. He brought suit for a declaratory
decree which the court in Idaho dismissed upon the ground that there was
no dispute between the parties. The court said, "The vendor says lie is
competent and he doesn't dispute the validity of his contract; and the vendee
clainis he has a good contract ; then there is no dispute." The heirs may have
been waiting for the vendor to die so they could then contend that the contract
was invalid because the vendor was incompetent.
In a suit 17 by beneficiaries under a will to have the will declared invalid.
the court upheld the will providing what unborn grandchildren were to take
in the event of the children's death prior to distribution at the time that
the youngest became thirty years of age, but the rights of such contingent
beneficiaries were not declared. That case was decided under the Uniform
Statute.
The fact that the determination of estate and inheritance taxes may turn
upon the declaratory judgment seems to be a circumstance tending to support
the exercise of the court's discretion in the matter as indicated in the
Wooster case,' 8 and In re _layer.19 There are numerous cases in which the
desirability of settling estate or inheritance taxes has been mentioned as a
medium for taking jurisdiction 20 and where the court refused to take juris-
diction or to render a declaratory decree.
The cases covered are those in which there is no dispute between the
parties as to what the will means, or whether it is valid. That suggests the
question of whether or not it is necessary in any case to have a dispute to
come into court. If a judicial declaration in favor of a plaintiff would be
obviously prejudicial or adverse to the interest of the defendant, there would
seemn to be a justiciable controversy, unless the defendant expressly admits
the plaintiff's claim. In other words, suppose the defendant, who is the
adverse party against whom you have brought your declaratory judgment
proceeding or are contemplating bringing it, simply doesn't dispute it. He
doesn't admit it and he doesn't deny it. He says, "I refuse to take a position,
but I don't waive anything. I don't admit what you claim and I don't deny
15. See note 12 supra.
16. Whitney v. Randall, 58 Ida. 49, 70 P.2d 384 (1937).
17. Story v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934).
18. See note 13 supra.
19. 73 N. Y. S.2d 715, 189 Misc. 700 (1947).
20. National Shawmut Bank v. Morey, 320 Mass. 492, 70 N.E.2d 316 (1946).
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it or waive anything." Where is there a justiciable controversy? It has been
suggested that if a judicial declaration in favor of the plaintiff would be
obviously prejudicial or adverse to the interest of the defendant, that would
constitute a justiciable controversy.
The refusal of the defendant to dispute or contradict does not deprive
plaintiff of right to relief provided defendant does not admit the plaintiff's
claim. In short, the plaintiff may force the defendant to admit or to deny
plaintilffs claim. If the defendant admits the plaintiff's claim, an order or
judgment dismissing the suit expressly on that ground would seem to be
just as- good and binding against the defendant as a judicial declaration by
the court. The foregoing seems to he necessarily deducible from the opinions
in two cases. 21 The State of Texas instituted a suit against the State of
Florida 22 and other states to obtain a declaratory judgment from tile United
States Supreme Court in reference to a decedent's property. There is sone
discussion by the United States Supreme Court in that case which bears on
this problenm. It is the opinion of the writer that the court cannot be deprived
of jurisdiction and the plaintiff be deprived of the rights of declaratory
judgment by a noncooperative and noncommittal adversary.
The following cases show the pitfalls in respect of future and contin-
gent interests and where all parties to be affected are not before the court
in person. Declaratory judgment proceedings are often class suits: and care
must be taken to see that all members of the class are present by representa-
tion so as to be effectively bound by a decree. In Van Roy v. Hoover,23 the
Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a decree refusing to construe a will upon
the ground that tile contingency that certain persons might survive the life
beneficiary was a contingency that might never arise, holding that when and
if such contingency did arise, it would be time enough to settle the question
whether or not there was an intestacy as to the remainder interest. In a
Florida case, 24 suit was brought for the construction of a deed; and the
court refused to determine what would he the status of a possible grantee
who might receive a conveyance from a living life tenant who also had a
reversionary interest subject to an intermediate contingent estate, holding that
to render such a judgment would be to determine rights that were not before
the court. Another Florida case 25 was a suit by a vendor against a second
purchaser to declare the rights of the parties in respect of the recording of
an unacknowledged prior contract to another person and of the expunge-
rent of such recording. The court said that while such record was
21. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270 (1941) ; Ir re
Kariber's Petition, 284 Pa. 455. 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
22. Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 407 (1934).
23. See note 3 supra.
24. Tarkersley v. Davis. 128 Fla. 507. 175 So. 501 (1937).
25. Lassiter v. Curtiss-Bright Co., 129 Fla. 728. 177 So. 201 (1937).
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not constructive notice, it might. nevertheless, have imparted actual
notice of the rights of such prior purchaser. Moreover. the prior purchaser
was not a party to the suit and the court held that her interests, if any,
could not be affected by the decree. In the Sample case.36 the Suplreme Court
of Florida held that under the declaratory judgmient statute it was not neces-
sary that there be an "acitial controversy.' It has been held under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act. and the Act expressly provides, that there must
be an "actual controversy." Therefore, it is conceivable that a suit properly
brought in the state court under the Florida declaratory judgment statute,
though otherwise removable to the federal courts, might not be removable
because of the lack of an "actual controversy." The Sample case was an action
to set aside a declaratory decree construing a will. Aiiong other objections
to the declaratory judgment. it was urged that persons affected were not
before the court. In answer to this, the supreme court said that if that were
true, such persons would not be bound by the decree. but that as all the
parties ihr the suit to impeach the declaratory decree were parties to the
previous suit, they were hound and had ample opportunity to make their
defenses. In a suit to set aside a declaratory decree which had been entered
on service by publication, the court held that the constructive service statute had
not been followed, and that therefore the service was defective and the
declaratory decree was not binding on the plaintiffs in the later suit.
27
CLASS SUITS
According to the great weight of authority 28 unborn contingent remain-
dermen may be represented, in case there are no living members of the same
class, by the persons who hold estates which precede or follow theirs, provided
sonie one or more of such persons would be adversely affected by the decree
equally with the class not in esse and would therefore have the same intcrest
and be equally certain to present to the court the merits of the question upon
which the decree is sought.
In a comparatively recent Florida decision,29 there was a suit for a
declaratory judgment to deternmine the amount of an attorney's fee. Con-
structive service was obtained against the defendant. The court held that
there was nothing but a personal claim: that there was no res; that the court
couldn't exercise its jurisdiction to quiet title to money that the plaintiff
had collected at some prior time-whether or not lie still had the money
in his pocket or whether lie had done something with it. It will be recalled
that the first paragraph of the constructive service statute 30 includes the
26, Sample v. Ward, 156 Fla. 210, 23 So.2d 81 (1945).
27. Cone v. Benjamin, 157 Fla. 800, 27 So.2d 90 (1946).
28. See Note, 120 A.L.R. 880 (1939).
29. Ake v. Chancey, 152 Fla. 677, 13 So.2d 6 (1943).
30. FLA, STAT. § 48,01 (1941).
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construction of "any contract or other written instrument." The court said,
"Furthermore a declaratory decree mst he predicated on a claim supported
by a ren." It is a serious question whether this sentence really means what
it appears to nilean taken all by itself. It would seem to lie a serious inplication
upon the application of the declaratory judgment statute. But it is possible
that what it means is that the declaratory decree "where it depends on
constructive service" (I am reading something into the opinion that is not
in there)-must lie predicated upon a claim sulplxorted by a renm.
I NSURA NCE
There has been a very large class of insurance cases ill which the declar-
atory judgment statute has been invoked. One of the most itnteresting cases
under the federal statute is the Aetna Life Insurance Co. case Si which has
certainly established a very broad jurisdiction in the insurance cases under the
federal statutes. and in the application of the various state laws. While a
suit at law '12 was pending against the insurer to recover disability benefits,
insurer filed a bill in equity to cancel the policy for fraud. During pelency
of the equity suit, the insured changed the beneficiary, naming his estate
as beneficiary. Because of such change, the lower court had held that the
bill 110 longer had any equity. This ruling was reversed by the suprene court,
which held that the jurisdiction of the lower court over the subject matter
was not lost by the act of the defendant pendeute life. The declaratory
judgment statute was not cited in the opinion.
There have been a great many cases on the question of coverages; a
leading case is Camden Fire Irsurance Co. v. Daylight Grocery.33 On the
question of casualty coverage, cases have determined the negligence of the
tortfeasor. whether or not there is misrepresentation; breach of warranty
or condition: violation of law: unauthorized or prohibited driver ; or a
violation of area or territorial restrictions.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The following cases indicate the extent to which the procedure has been
used in the field of administrative law:
The Amos case," decided in 1922, was a suit against the state comp-
troller to declare unconstitutional the gasoline tax statute alleged not to have
been signed by the presiding officers of the Senate and House until after the
time within which acts are required by the constitution to be so signed. The
31. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1937).
32. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n v. Ott, 151 Fla. 185, 9 So.2d 383
(1942).
33. 152 Fla. 669, 12 So.2d 768 (1943).
34. Amos v. Guin, 84 Fla. 285, 94 So. 615 (1922).
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court first affirmed an order overruling a demurrer to the bill of complaint;
and, later, on rehearing, the court reversed the lower court and directed
the bill to be dismissed, with leave to amend so as to make specific allegations
of fraud in connection with the signing of the bill.
In a suit by the attorney general to obtain a declaratory judgment
regarding the validity of Everglades Drainage District taxes, 5 the lower
court dismissed the bill on the merits of the issue. Although the decree was
affirmed, the supreme court, by Terrell, J., said the court did not think that
the declaratory judgment statute contemplated this kind of suit, no reasons
being stated in the opinion for this conclusion, except reasons which touch the
merits of the controversy. City of Miami v. K. C. Hink 11 was a suit against
the city to determine the validity of a liquor licensing ordinance. Satan
Fraternity v. Board of Public Instruction 17 was a suit to determine the
validity of the statute forbidding school fraternities. Ball v. Branch a1 was
a suit against county commissioners to obtain a decree declaring a certain
statute unconstitutional. The statute related to the public health service of
the City of Tampa and County of Ilillsborough. This suit resembles the case
of Alsop v. Pierce," in that it was one seeking a declaration regarding the
functions of public officials; a sinilar suit 40 was to obtain a declaration
regarding the duties of county commissioners in respect to the preparation
of ballots for an election. Ailler v. Doss 41 was a suit against the tax assessor
for a declaratory decree claiming that the tax assessor had arbitrarily
exempted certain property from taxation. Tt (loes not appear from the report
that the plaintiff had any personal or proprietary interest in the subject matter
of the suit, or that he sued otherwise than as a citizen. Nor does it appear
that the property owner whose property was alleged to have been wrongfully
exempted was made a party. The Alsop case 42 was a suit brought by the
mayor of the city of Jacksonville against the City Commission for a declar-
atory judgment as to the rights, powers and jurisdiction of the respective
parties under the city charter. The City Commission, which was defendant in
the case, contended that such a controversy was not a proper one tinder the
declaratory judgment statute; 1ut the supreme court said. "it would be
difficult to find a more appropriate case for the law permitting declaratory
judgments." In a suit " by a number of labor unions for a declaratory
decree against the attorney general and against a number of corporate
35. State v. Everglades Drainage District, 155 Fia. 403, 20 So.2d 397 (1945).
36. 156 Fla. 87, 22 So.2d 627 (1945).
37. 156 Fla. 222, 22 So.2d 892 (1945).
38. 154 Fla. 57, 16 So.2d 524 (1944).
39. 155 Fla. 185, 19 So.2d 799 (1944).
40. Cobb v. Board of City Comn'rs.. 155 Fla. 60, 19 So.2d 505 (1944).
41. Miller v. Doss, 36 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1948).
42. See note 39 supra.
43. A. F. of L. v. Watson, 159 Fla. 333, 31 So.2d 394 (1947).
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employers, the bill Was disMissel upon the ground of multifariousness, the
court asserting that it combined six different law suits in one bill of comi-
plaint. It is interesting to note that on appeal of that case, 44 the United States
Supreme Court by Douglas, J., said, ". . . and other actions, such as suits
for a declaratory judgment, would seem to be available in the State Courts."
In a suit "I involving train limit law, the state attorney general had said
that lie did not know whether he would enforce the law or not, and the court
dismissed the suit. Thereafter the attorney general immediately commenced
two prosecutions while the declaratory judgment proceeding was still in the
circuit court of appeals ; Iut that court affirmed the lower court judgment and
disnissal and held that the plaintiff wotld have to file a new declaratory
judgnent suit.
46
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was enacted in 1934.47 It applies
by its terms to cases of "actual controversy" and the court is authorized
to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party. The act
was amended in 1935 48 so as to incorporate an express exception with
respect to federal taxes. It has been held that this exception implies that
declaratory judgments may be rendered with respect to state taxes, and such
judgments are frequently rendered.
The tone of many decisions rendered under the early declaratory judg-
ment statute has been thoroughly sarcastic. Comments such as, "The Court
is called upon for legal advice . . . to decide moot questions." But the tone
of the decisions and the attitude of the courts have undergone an obvious
change in the last 15 or 20 years, especially since so many of the states have
adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Statute. In recent years the
decisions have been conspicuously much more liberal.
As will be recalled, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Statute employs
the phrase "actual controversy." But the Supreme Court of Florida has
held that an actual controversy is not necessary." The phrase "actual contro-
versy" involves a question of interpretation, and there are some ill-defined
twilight zones on whether or not an actual controversy exists in a given
situation. But the fact that the Suprenie Court of Florida has held that an
actual controversy is not necessary may very vell raise some serious doubts
as to whether a party could get into the federal courts, for exaniple, on
44. A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946).
45. Southern Pacific Co. v. Conway, 115 F.2d 740 (1940).
46. See City of Pensacola v. Johnson, 159 Fla. 566, 28 So.2d 905 (1947), where
the court held that it was not a judicial function to determine by declaratory decree
whether homesteads should be taxable for payment of municipal bonds before issuance of
the bonds by the city in question was authorized at a special election not yet held.
47. 48 STAT. 955 (1934)? as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 400 (1946).
48. 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. § 400 (1946).
49. See note 26 .sipro.
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diversity of citizenship, in a case arising under the Florida statute, where
a federal court might have border-line jurisdiction.
The Federal Judicial Code, which has been completely rewritten. omits
the provision in the federal statute which expressly provided for written
interrogatories to the jury. The reviser's note states that the reason for the
omission is that a party can present his special interrogatories under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49.0, Now there is a question whether
that procedure has the same effect or not. Under the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Statute a party had the right to submit special interrogatories to
the jury; but under Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar
as it has been interpreted by the courts in Florida, it is not a matter of right,
but is a matter within the discretion of a certain judge.
50. 28 U. S. C. Fed. R. Civ. P. (1946).
